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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Melvin Arthur McCabe pleaded guilty to one count
of possession of a controlled substance and to an enhancement for a previous offense.
The district court imposed a unified sentence of fourteen years, with six years fixed.
Mr. McCabe appeals from the district court's judgment of conviction.

Mr. McCabe

asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it failed to sua sponte order a
mental health evaluation and make a determination as to Mr. McCabe's competency to
represent himself. Additionally, Mr. McCabe asserts that the district court abused its
discretion when it den

his motion

withdraw his guilty

and his accompanying

motion for a retroactive competency evaluation.
The State raises two arguments. The first claims that Mr. McCabe waived his
right to challenge the failure of the district court to sua sponte order a competency
evaluation when he pied guilty. The State asserts that by entering an unconditional plea
of guilty, Mr. McCabe waived his right to challenge any alleged failure to order an
evaluation. Secondly, the State asserts that Mr. McCabe has failed to show the district
court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because the
district court correctly concluded that Mr. McCabe's claim of incompetence was refuted
by the entire record. And thus, no manifest injustice was demonstrated.
The State's first argument fails because it relies on precedent that does not apply
in this case.

The State's second argument fails because the record reflects several

instances where Mr. McCabe's incompetence from his long-term drug use was evident.

1

was

not only when

his right

but on

day he

guilty.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. McCabe's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but
are incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUES
1.

Did
district court abuse its discretion when it failed
sua sponte order a
mental health evaluation and make a determination as to Mr. McCabe's
competency to represent himself?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. McCabe's Rule 33(c)
motion to withdraw his guilty plea and his accompanying motion for a retroactive
competency evaluation?
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ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Failed To Sua Sponte Order A
Competency Hearing Because The District Court's Own Statements, And Those Of
Mr. McCabe, Demonstrated That Mr. McCabe Was Not Competent To Represent
Himself
The State's claim that Mr. McCabe waived his right to challenge any alleged
failure to order a mental health evaluation fails because it relies on precedent that is
distinguishable from this case. The State argues that Mr. McCabe waived his right to
challenge any alleged failure to order a mental health evaluation because he entered an
unconditional guilty plea. (Resp. Br. p.4.) But the State's reliance on State v. AI-Kotrani
is misplaced for several reasons.

141 Idaho 66 (Idaho 2005).

First, AI-Kotrani was

represented by counsel in all the proceedings below. Id. at 69.

Second, the district

court in A/-Kotrani ordered a mental health evaluation as required by I.C. § 18-211. Id.
at 68. And third, the district court there actually held a competency hearing after AIKotrani's evaluation. Id. at 69.
In its analysis as to why AI-Kotrani waived his right with his plea, the Idaho
Supreme Court specifically referenced these issues. Id. at 69-70. It said
The Defendant argues that an allegedly incompetent defendant should not
be held to have waived any rights by entering an unconditional plea of
guilty. Although such argument has some appeal, it overlooks two facts.
First, the Defendant was represented by counsel throughout the
proceedings below. There is a strong presumption that his counsel's
performance was within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance. State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 988 P.2d 1170 (1999).
Second, the trial court found, after a hearing, that the Defendant was
competent to stand trial. On appeal, this Court does not reweigh the
evidence regarding competency, but will affirm the district court's finding if it
is supported by sufficient, competent evidence, even if the evidence is
conflicting. State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 90 P.3d 278 (2003). Thus, the
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is whether the Defendant received the effective assistance of
counsel when
ing to enter an unconditional plea of guilty.
Id. at 69-70 (emphasis added)

Here, by contrast, Mr. McCabe was not represented below for any significant
period, 1 never underwent a mental health evaluation, and the district court never held a
competency hearing. The district court did hold a Faretta 2 hearing, but, as argued in his
Appellant's Brief, both Mr. McCabe's statements, and those of the district court, brought
Mr. McCabe's competence into question at that hearing. (See App. Br. pp.10-11.) If
indeed, the real issue in AI-Kotrani was whether the defendant received the effective
assistance of counsel, it does not apply to this case because Mr. McCabe was not
represented by counsel when he made the decision to enter an unconditional plea of
guilty. And, he was incompetent when he made the decision to represent himself. Thus
the State's argument fails.
II.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. McCabe's Rule 33(c)
Motion To Withdraw His Guilty Plea And His Accompanying Motion For A Retroactive
Competency Evaluation

A.

Introduction
The State argues that Mr. McCabe's claim that he was incompetent fails because

it is refuted by the record. However, the record contains statements from Mr. McCabe

The order allowing his public defender to withdraw was filed on March 7, 2013, but the
record indicates the public defender's first motion to withdraw was submitted on
February 5, 2013. That motion stated that "the relationship between attorney and client
has deteriorated to such an extent so as to leave counsel unable to effectively represent
the defendant and/or his interests in this matter." (R., p.73.) Thus, Mr. McCabe was
only effectively represented by counsel at his initial appearance and the preliminary
hearing. (R., p.72.) Mr. McCabe did not plead guilty until May 13, 2013. (See 5/13/13
transcript.)
1
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that demonstrate his incompetence on the day he pleaded guilty. Further, at

one

he submitted to the court also showed his incompetence, as well as his
delusional and paranoid nature as he tried to represent himself prior to his guilty plea.
Therefore, he asserts the district court's denial of his Rule 33(c) motion was premature
because it failed to grant Mr. McCabe's motion for a retroactive competency
determination.

B.

The State's Argument That Mr. McCabe Did Not Demonstrate Any Manifest
Injustice Fails Because The Record Demonstrates That His Plea Was Not
Knowing, Intelligent, And Voluntary Due To His Long-Term Methamphetamine
Use
The

that "[n]othing in the record creates a genuine

bt as to

McCabe's ability to understand the nature of the proceedings against him or represent
himself." (Resp. Br., p.11.) But Mr. McCabe's incompetence was evident on the day of
his change of plea hearing.

For example, the transcript from that hearing reflects

Mr. McCabe's confusion leading up to his plea.

For some reason, Mr. McCabe was

under the impression that a transcript of the preliminary hearing had been prepared
when in fact it was not. And he was obviously confused as to who might have ordered
its preparation. The conversation went as follows:
THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, excuse me.

THE COURT: Yes. Go ahead.

THE DEFENDANT: I haven't -

and there's testimony that's in the

preliminary hearing that's relevant to the trial and I haven't received the
preliminary hearing transcript. I know you ordered it.

2

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
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THE COURT: I never did order it. I think there was an issue as to whether
or not the counsel had previously ordered the preparation of the
preliminary hearing transcript, and that was discussed in the motion that I
heard before counsel, but there's never been a formal request or an order
submitted for the preparation of that transcript itself.

THE DEFENDANT: Ms. DePew is here and she did order it, but I didn't
put it in the preliminary hearing, and then I think it got caught between my
case and the case that was after mine, because she did say it after the
case was over.

THE COURT: Well, I went back
and listened to

when I heard the motion, I went back

recording of the preliminary hearing and there was no

request for the preliminary hearing transcript on the record.

THE DEFENDANT: I guess I'm stuck out in no-man's-land there, but she
did request it. It's caught between cases. I know she did. I heard it with
my own ears, and she admitted it, but it's neither here nor there. I'm ready
to go if-

(Tr. 5/13/13, p.4, L.7 - p.5, L.11)
Once again, these sorts of statements, and the odd, disjointed nature with which
Mr. McCabe spoke should have alerted the court to Mr. McCabe's confusion and
incompetence on the very day that he pleaded guilty. He was convinced a transcript
had been ordered but was obviously confused as to who ordered it. And the district
court confirmed that it was never ordered at all.
Moreover, one of the documents he submitted to the court prior to his guilty plea
also reflected his delusional nature. In his Rebuttal to Answer responding to the State's
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Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Suppress, he tried to argue that a
conspiracy existed to entrap him into violating a driving suspension in order to
probable cause to arrest him. (See R. pp.293-297.) The entire document is difficult to
understand. But it appears that Mr. McCabe was trying to argue that Officer Summers
served him a with a "bogus" Notice of Suspension that indicated his driving privileges
were suspended until January 14, 2013, when in reality there was a second Notice of
Suspension pending that began on that same date. Therefore, Mr. McCabe argued that
Officer Summers, the officer who arrested him, purposefully let Mr. McCabe "rely on this
first notice to calculate when the administrative driving suspension had ended in order
to drive," and this was an unlawful "abuse of police power

to bamboozle

McCabe into believing that the driving suspension had been lifted, all the while,
entrapping McCabe into violating that same law, then using it to establish the probable
cause for the arrest and subsequent search." (R., p.296.)
This sort of paranoid entrapment argument, and his confusion on the day he
pleaded guilty, should have indicated to the court that Mr. McCabe was not competent
Thus because the entire record does not support the fact that Mr. McCabe's guilty plea
was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, he asserts that he has shown that manifest
injustice occurred when the district court denied his motion for a retroactive competency
evaluation and prematurely denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Even if this
court cannot say he was incompetent, his confused statements and odd arguments at
least warranted a retroactive competency evaluation. Therefore, Mr. McCabe asserts
the district court abused its discretion.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. McCabe respectfully requests that this Court

his judgment of

conviction and remand the case for withdrawal of the guilty plea or, in the alternative, a
competency determination.
DATED this 1 fh day of July, 2014.

REED P. ANDER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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